Working Papers:
"Public Pensions and the Elasticity of Elderly Labor Force Nonparticipation: Evidence from the Railroad Retirement Act” (Job Market Paper)
Abstract
The 20th century decline in male elderly labor force participation (LFP) constitutes one of the most significant changes to labor markets in modern history. A popular explanation for the decline is the rise of public pensions, yet markedly different estimates of the responsiveness of retirement to changes in benefits leave their role in causing this decline unclear. This paper develops the earliest estimates of responsiveness to Defined Benefit public pensions in the United States by examining the Railroad Retirement Acts (RRA) of the 1930s, which expanded eligibility and increased benefits through a public pension program comparable in many ways to Social Security. Using linked Census Records between 1920, 1930, and 1940, I first estimate the reduced form effect on retirement via a triple-differences design that compares railroad to other pension-covered workers, between 1930 and 1940, for pension-eligible (>=65) and ineligible (<65) ages. Railroad workers differentially exited only at eligible ages, explaining a non-negligible share of elderly male LFP declines. The RRA also increased home ownership and reduced unemployment of younger workers. I next develop a strategy to estimate the elasticity of elderly nonparticipation with respect to pension wealth that exploits the newly progressive benefit formula under the RRA. I find a range of roughly .1-.2 that is much lower than estimates from comparable periods but quite similar to estimates from Social Security in modern settings. Applying these estimates to large expansions to Social Security benefits in the 1950s indicate that changes to Social Security coverage were more important than increases to benefits in driving LFP declines.
Work in Progress:
“The Expansion of Social Security and the Decline of Elderly Public Assistance” (Joint with Daniel Fetter)
Abstract
Among the most consequential changes in the American economy over the 20th century was the growth of the government’s role in providing social insurance and transfers, especially to the elderly. A central element of this growth was a change in the level of government that administered and funded transfers. We investigate the expansion of the nationally-administered Old Age and Survivors Insurance (commonly known as Social Security) and its role in the decline of the state-administered Old Age Assistance (OAA) program from the 1940s through the 1970s. We document the degree to which Social Security crowded out OAA and the ways in which states responded to its expansion.
“Who Benefits from Federal Welfare Spending? Evidence from the Introduction of Progressive Cost Sharing” (Joint with Andrew Goodman-Bacon)
Abstract
In 1958 the federal government began to provide more generous financial matching for welfare programs in poorer states than in richer ones. The goal was to encourage the least generous states to pay higher benefits. We evaluate the effect of this reform on benefits, on state savings, and other state tax/spending policies.
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"Public Pensions and the Elasticity of Elderly Labor Force Nonparticipation: Evidence from the Railroad Retirement Act” (Job Market Paper)
Abstract
The 20th century decline in male elderly labor force participation (LFP) constitutes one of the most significant changes to labor markets in modern history. A popular explanation for the decline is the rise of public pensions, yet markedly different estimates of the responsiveness of retirement to changes in benefits leave their role in causing this decline unclear. This paper develops the earliest estimates of responsiveness to Defined Benefit public pensions in the United States by examining the Railroad Retirement Acts (RRA) of the 1930s, which expanded eligibility and increased benefits through a public pension program comparable in many ways to Social Security. Using linked Census Records between 1920, 1930, and 1940, I first estimate the reduced form effect on retirement via a triple-differences design that compares railroad to other pension-covered workers, between 1930 and 1940, for pension-eligible (>=65) and ineligible (<65) ages. Railroad workers differentially exited only at eligible ages, explaining a non-negligible share of elderly male LFP declines. The RRA also increased home ownership and reduced unemployment of younger workers. I next develop a strategy to estimate the elasticity of elderly nonparticipation with respect to pension wealth that exploits the newly progressive benefit formula under the RRA. I find a range of roughly .1-.2 that is much lower than estimates from comparable periods but quite similar to estimates from Social Security in modern settings. Applying these estimates to large expansions to Social Security benefits in the 1950s indicate that changes to Social Security coverage were more important than increases to benefits in driving LFP declines.
Work in Progress:
“The Expansion of Social Security and the Decline of Elderly Public Assistance” (Joint with Daniel Fetter)
Abstract
Among the most consequential changes in the American economy over the 20th century was the growth of the government’s role in providing social insurance and transfers, especially to the elderly. A central element of this growth was a change in the level of government that administered and funded transfers. We investigate the expansion of the nationally-administered Old Age and Survivors Insurance (commonly known as Social Security) and its role in the decline of the state-administered Old Age Assistance (OAA) program from the 1940s through the 1970s. We document the degree to which Social Security crowded out OAA and the ways in which states responded to its expansion.
“Who Benefits from Federal Welfare Spending? Evidence from the Introduction of Progressive Cost Sharing” (Joint with Andrew Goodman-Bacon)
Abstract
In 1958 the federal government began to provide more generous financial matching for welfare programs in poorer states than in richer ones. The goal was to encourage the least generous states to pay higher benefits. We evaluate the effect of this reform on benefits, on state savings, and other state tax/spending policies.
Social Media